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Book Review
YALE, 1927-1960. By Laura Kalman.* Chapel
Hill, N.C. and London: Umversity of North Carolina Press,
1986. Pp. xii, 314, notes, index. $35.00 cloth.
LEGAL REALISM AT

A number of somewhat semor members of the bar and others
still refer to Yale Law School as a place where sociology, not
law, is taught. This outmoded recollection relates back to that
period most marked in the first half of the twentieth century
when legal realism was a movement espoused by many members
of the Yale Law School faculty I
In Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960, Laura Kalman has
written a superb and fascinating history of the legal realism
movement at Yale Law School. The book is well written and
reads easily, but it is not destined to make the New York Times
best seller list as did one lasting legal realism study published in
the 1930s. 2 Professor Kalman's book will appeal to law professors, historians, political scientists, philosophers, educators, and
students. Lawyers who were too heavily overworked as law
students to see the forest for the trees will be intrigued by the
evolutionary processes that tugged at the making of casebooks.
Professor Kalman has created a work that is faithful to the
historical method by portraying the subject accurately without
editorializing. For example, she does not allude to the near
absence of women on the law faculties of the day or mention
the paucity of female students. In fact, in addition to Dorothy
Swaine Thomas, the first woman to teach a course at Yale Law
School, Professor Kalman mentions only two other women by
name: Emma Corstvet, Professor Underhill Moore's research
3
assistant, and Mary Beard, the historian.
* Associate Professor of History, University of California at Santa Barbara.
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One can read Legal Realism at Yale on three levels. First,
the book begins with an essay about legal realism that taken
alone would make an outstanding article. Second, the book
describes legal realism as an academic movement at Yale and
Columbia. Third, the book is a subtle account of the office
politics and the idiosyncrasies and personalities of famous professors and academicians. In this jungle, far deeper and darker
than any forest, Professor Kalman declares, "all law is politics." 4
Neither the law nor legal realism is all politics. Legal realism's impact and effect among law professors and its resulting
tensions and alliances create a fascinating mix; however, in
concluding that "the members of the legal process school
denied realism's most important message, a message so arresting
that even the realists never dared face it-that all law is politics,'' 5 Laura Kalman appears to miss some of the valuable
lessons of her own intriguing study of this significant movement
in jurisprudence and legal education.
Before discussing Professor Kalman's description of legal
realism, her analysis of its influence on legal education at Yale
and Columbia, and the palace intrigue and office politics of the
academic community, a few suggestions are in order. Greater
use of outside materials would have strengthened Legal Realism
at Yale. Professor Kalman relied too heavily on the law schools'
archives. A somewhat broader base of research material would
have provided a wider perspective. 6 In addition, an appendix
which indexes the innumerable names in the book with brief
biographical statements would have been especially helpful; only
a few professors from the 1920s and the 1930s have achieved
lasting fame within the profession to permit modern day readers
to know them. Also, a general bibliography of works of legal
realism and legal education would have been helpful.
Professor Kalman makes no direct attempt to define legal
realism or to define a legal realist. Indeed, such definitions are
4 Id. at 231.

5Id.
6 For example, Professor Kalman did not mention Justice Cardozo's view of legal
realism. See SELECT D WRITINGS OF BENJAmIN NATHAN CARwozo: THE CHOICE oF TYCHO

Bi.AHi 15 (M. Hall ed. 1947) [hereinafter SELECTED WRITINGs OF CARDOZO] ("Now, if
neo-realism means this
it is a false and misleading cult.
").
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necessarily vague. Judge Richard A. Posner, an emnnent scholar
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
observed recently that
"Realist" can mean cynical, reductiomst, manipulative, hostile
to law, political, left-wing, epistemologically naive-but also
progressive, humane, candid, mature, clear-eyed. These usages
reflect the polemical character of so much writing about law
Legal realism is also used to refer to the work of particular
academic lawyers, mainly on the Yale and Columbia faculties
and to specific (and diverse)
during the 1920's and 1930's,
7
ideas held by those men.
Perhaps the imprecision of this recent definition reinforces
an earlier statement by Pollack:
It has frequently been said that there is no single description
of American legal realism. Being a method rather than a
system, there are as many descriptions of the movement as
there are realists, since each theorist espouses a distinguishably
different viewpoint. Notwithstanding these differences, there is
an observable common pattern in their pronouncements-that
the law is what the courts and the officials do regarding legal
cases.'
Other definitions of realism are similarly general in nature:
The American realists stem from the judge-centred approach
of J.C. Gray and the skepticism of Holmes, J., and emphasize
the uncertainty of the law and the importance of the attitude
of the judges; what these officials do about disputes is the law
Realism had some affinities with the pragmatism of William
James and the work of John Dewey After Holmes the main,
figures were Llewellyn, Cook, and Jerome Frank (qq.v.). Their
approach is a combination of analytical, positivist, and sociological. The importance of their work was to concentrate attention on litigation, judges and judicial attitudes, empiricism,
the influences which affect judges (of which the words of
statutes and cases are only some), and on the operation of law

7 Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CAsE W R.s. L. Rsv 179, 181 (1986-87).
1 E. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 787
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in society Law is a means to social ends, but must be evaluated
in terms of its effects. 9
In 1931, Roscoe Pound noted that
the new juristic realists hardly use realism in a techmcal philosophical sense. They use it rather in the sense which it bears
in art. By realism they mean fidelity to nature, accurate recording of things as they are, as contrasted with things as they
are imagined to be, or wished to be, or as one feels they ought
to be. They mean by realism faithful adherence to the actualities of the legal order as the basis of a science of law 10
Nevertheless, Jerome N. Frank, later Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Judge on the Second
Circuit, viewed legal realism in part from the perspective of
living in "the real world" to use a phrase favored by trial
lawyers:
If anyone doubts the truth of this picture [of uncertainty in
the law and inability to predict the outcome of cases]; let him
spend several years in law offices and court rooms, noting the
effect on court decisions in actual lawsuits (relating to property
or contract or anything else) of perjury, mistaken testimony,
coached witnesses; of lazy, stupid, energetic, brilliant or crooked
lawyers; of honest, intelligent, biased, ignorant, lazy or dishonest judges; of appeals to bigotry or thick-headedness of
juries."
With this untidy background of legal realism, Professor Kalman presents a superb analysis of legal realism relating to legal
education. Jerome Frank applauded the "hunch" or "gut reaction" to decision making that Judge Joseph Hutcheson advanced,1 2 but Justice Cardozo deplored it.13 While some advanced
Jerome Frank's psychoanalytical approach to law, "one critic
of the realists pointed out [that] the logical implications of

9 D. WALKER, THE OxFORD CompAmoN TO LAW 1037 (1980).

10Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,44 HARv L. REv 697, 697 (1930-

31).
, Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 48 (1931-32).
See Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L. REv 274 (1928-29).
" See SELECTED WRrnwGs oF CAwozo, supra note 6, at 15.
2
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'gastronomic jurisprudence' were that law schools should teach
' 14
their students how to psychoanalyze and bribe judges.
At Yale and Columbia, the case method and the quest for
legal certainty and fixed rules of law clashed with the Legal
Realists' desire to incorporate the ideas of Charles Beard and
Charles Merriam into the curriculum. The Realists followed a
functional approach to analyzing various subjects in legal education. In a functional approach, for example, the law of partnerships was combined with the law of corporations, into one
course covering business entities.' 5
Legal realism also brought about the inclusion of courses
and professors from differing fields of scholarship. By 1931, the
faculty of Yale Law School included a psychiatry professor and
an econormst. In 1932, Columbia Law School had a finance
professor and a political scientist. 16 These functional and multidisciplinary changes proved both revolutionary and lasting in
their impact.
Over the years, the clash was resolved, and in the years
following World War II, the emphasis on realism at Yale decreased, while the impact of nonlegal subjects increased at other
schools including Harvard. The influence of the Legal Realists
on our system of legal education has been significant and concrete. Professor Kalman describes with interesting detail the
development of law school curricula and casebooks.
Legal Realism at Yale contains the names of distinguished
legal scholars and law professors. While some names endure
because of the lasting value of their work or because they have
achieved recogmtion and distinction elsewhere, most of the names
will be a bit of a puzzle for many readers not steeped in the
history of the particular law school or in the history of legal
education in the period that she covers. While William 0 Douglas, Harlan Fisk Stone, Abe Fortus, and Felix Frankfurter have
achieved lasting fame within the legal profession by their appointments to the Supreme Court, Arthur L. Corbin, Karl Llewellyn, Roscoe Pound, Christopher Columbus Langdell, James

", L. KA mAN, supra note 3,
at 7 (citing Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About
Realism, 43 YAE L.J. 1240, 1252 (1933-34)).

Id. at 30.
16

Id. at 75.
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Barr Ames, Eugene V Rostou, and Erwin N. Griswold remain
known by virtue of their impact on the legal education commumty Most readers probably do not recognize other beautiful
names, such as Hessel Yntema and Myres McDougal.
In a sense, the most interesting aspect of Professor Kalman's
study involves the personality conflicts. Lawyers love to fight.
Human aggression speaks loudly in the courtroom where indoor
battles are fought daily After all, Justice Brandeis explained
that he "would rather fight than eat.' 1 7 The unplanned theme
of combat in the ivory tower provides great reader interest. For
example, in 1928, William 0 Douglas and other faculty members resigned from Columbia Law School m protest over the
failure of Columbia's President, Nicholas Murray Butler, to
consult with them on the appointment of a new dean. 18 Earlier,
Butler's criticisms of the law school had caused Harlan Fisk
Stone to resign as dean.' 9
In an endnote, Professor Kalman recounts the censorship of
the Yale Law Journal by Professor Harry Shulman, the Journal's faculty advisor. Professor Fred Rodell wrote a book review
containing one sentence critical of Felix Frankfurter Shulman
urged the students not to publish the book review unless the
sentence was deleted or revised. Freedom of the press, freedom
of expression, and free criticism fell- by the wayside, but the
Columbia Law Review published the review in full, criticism of
20
Justice Frankfurter included.
In another endnote, Felix Frankfurter quoted Learned Hand's
view of Jerome Frank's long opinions by using the word "shit"
Learned Hand had said, "I see how [Frank] comes out, and I
pay no attention to the shit." 2' Frankfurter must have written
in a moment of indiscretion, since he was sensitive to history
and should have known that his papers would be preserved in
archives at Harvard or in Washington. Those respectful of pnvacy should not record words not meant to be quoted. Nevertheless, good footnotes can liven up jurisprudential histories.

" L. BAKER, BRANDis AND FRANKFURTER: A DuAL BioGRAPHY 91 (1984).
IS L. KAMAN, supra note 3, at 74.
19 Id.
at 69.

10Id. at 280 n.51.
21 Id. at 284 n.92.
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Two questions come to mind that do not fall within the time
frame of Legal Realism at Yale. One is whether Cardozo's
lectures at Yale Law School, entitled "The Nature of the Judicial
Process,"2 2 had any impact on the development of the legal
realism movement at Yale Law School. The other is whether the
lasting impact of legal realism at Yale had any discernible influence on two distinguished jurists who were educated in New
Haven, Justice Potter Stewart and Justice Bryon White. A word
in the epilogue or a footnote on these early and late matters
might have added a bit more breadth to this excellent legal and
histoncal study
Paul Brickner**

B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, reprintedin SELECTED WRITINGS
oF CARDozo, supra note 6, at 107.
** Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Cleveland, Ohio; Vice-President, Oluo State Board of Education. B.A., Umversity of Richmond, 1962; J.D., Case Western Reserve Umversity, 1966; LL.M., Cleveland State
University, 1983.

